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计及绿电溯源的含光储虚拟电厂主从博弈定价机制

Stackelberg Game-Based Pricing Mechanism for a PV-Storage Virtual Power Plant Considering Green Electricity Traceability

  • 摘要: 针对虚拟电厂内部各主体独立运营、传统定价未充分体现绿电环境价值的问题,本文提出一种面向含光储虚拟电厂的计及绿电溯源主从博弈定价机制。本文先设计绿电溯源与环境量化体系,将环境溢价嵌入柔性负荷效用函数。接着建立以含光储的虚拟电厂聚合商为领导者、柔性负荷为跟随者的主从博弈模型。针对柔性负荷的连续凸优化问题,结合KKT条件和大M法,将该模型转化为易于求解的混合整数线性规划(MILP)问题。结果表明,该机制通过绿电溢价激励需求响应,促使用户负荷向光伏大发时段平移,在实现多方共赢的基础上,显著提高了系统绿电就地消纳能力。

     

    Abstract: To address the issue that various participants in a virtual power plant operate independently and traditional pricing doesn"t fully reflect the environmental value of green electricity, this paper proposes a leader-follower pricing mechanism for virtual power plants with photovoltaic storage that accounts for green electricity tracking. First, we design a green electricity tracking and environmental quantification system, embedding the environmental premium into the flexible load utility function. Then, we establish a leader-follower game model where the virtual power plant aggregator with photovoltaic storage acts as the leader and the flexible loads are the followers. For the continuous convex optimization problem of flexible loads, by combining the KKT conditions and the big-M method, the model is converted into a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) problem that is easier to solve. The results show that this mechanism incentivizes demand response through green electricity premiums, encouraging users to shift their loads to times of high photovoltaic generation, and significantly improves the local absorption capacity of green electricity while achieving a win-win outcome for all parties.

     

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