基于Stackelberg博弈的含共享储能综合能源系统优化调度研究
Research on Optimal Scheduling of Integrated Energy System with Shared Energy Storage Based on Stackelberg Game
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摘要: 综合能源系统(Integrated Energy System,IES)与共享储能对实现"双碳"目标具有显著效益。针对IES内多元决策主体利益冲突以及缺乏储能设备参与优化等问题,提出了一种基于Stackelberg博弈的含共享储能IES优化调度模型。首先,阐述了用户侧微能源系统的框架以及系统中各决策主体的作用。其次,建立了微网运营商(Micro Grid Operator,MGO)、共享储能运营商(Shared Energy Storage Operator,SESO)和用户聚合商(User Aggregator,UA)的优化运行模型,并构建了含共享储能的IES中上层为MGO与下层为UA的Stackelberg博弈模型,并证明了博弈均衡解的存在性与唯一性。最后,通过算例分析验证所提优化调度模型的有效性。实验结果表明,所提优化调度模型有效提高了用户侧电、热调节的灵活性,在为MGO的电、热价提供决策方案的同时,实现了SESO和UA之间收益的双赢。该研究成果为含共享储能的IES运行优化提供了一种可行的解决方案。Abstract: Integrated energy system (IES) and shared energy storage offer significant benefits for achieving the "dual carbon" goals. To address the conflicts of interest among multiple decision-makers within IES and the lack of energy storage participation in optimization, an optimal scheduling model for IES with shared energy storage based on Stackelberg game theory is proposed. Firstly, the framework of the user-side micro-energy system and the role of each decision-making body in the system are described. Secondly, optimization operation models for the microgrid operator (MGO), shared energy storage operator (SESO), and user aggregator (UA) are established. A Stackelberg game model is constructed for IES with shared energy storage, where the MGO acts as the leader and the UA as the follower. The existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium solution are demonstrated. Finally, case studies validate the effectiveness of the proposed optimal scheduling model. Experimental results show that the model significantly enhances the flexibility of electricity and heat regulation on the user side, provides decision-making strategies for electricity and heat pricing for the MGO, and achieves a win-win outcome for both SESO and UA in terms of revenue. This research offers a feasible solution for optimizing the operation of IES with shared energy storage.
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